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Behavioural biasa b s t r a c t
We investigate whether credit rating agencies are biased towards areas with strong finan-
cial centre characteristics, using data for 259 areas from 39 countries for 2004–17. We
employ a range of measurements of financial centre characteristics, including a financial
centre index, the share of financial and business services in an area’s total employment,
and revenues from investment banking. For all financial centre proxies, our results confirm
the existence of a ‘financial centre bias’ that is statistically and economically significant. For
example, cities present in the global financial centre index have a rating about a category
higher than would be justified by fundamentals.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Credit ratings agencies (CRAs) form an intrinsic component of contemporary financial markets. Their ratings influence the
cost of borrowing of corporate and public bond issuers, as well as their norms of governance. Despite a plethora of rating
agencies around the world, there are only three truly global agencies: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. Together, these three agencies
control about 95% of the credit rating market, including Moody’s share of about 33% (SEC, 2018). All three CRAs are owned by
US conglomerates and headquartered in New York City (Fitch is the only agency with dual headquarters in New York and
London). Given the role of the CRAs in the subprime mortgage crisis and the associated critique, their influence could have
eroded as a result. Recent literature, however, shows that their power has endured (e.g. Binici et al., 2018; Mennillo and
Sinclair, 2019). This makes it even more important to investigate how these agencies interact with and affect municipal
and regional governments around the world that want to access the international bond market.
While sub-sovereign bond borrowing has a long history in the United States, its rise elsewhere is relatively recent.1 A ser-
ies of World Bank reports explains this surge as fuelled by fiscal decentralisation, including the enhanced taxation powers of
local governments and their capacity to issue their own bonds; unprecedented pace of urbanisation, particularly in developing
countries; and a shift away from bank borrowing (see Liu and Waibel, 2008; Canuto and Liu, 2010). According to the evidencePažitka).
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lion USD in 2000 to more than 300 billion in 2009.
Fig. 1 extends the data of Canuto and Liu (2010) up to 2017. As it shows, the annual issuance of sub-sovereign debt
remained higher than 300 billion USD for several years after the outbreak of the crisis and is still much higher than in
the early 2000 s. To corroborate this trend, the figure also displays the increase in the number of sub-sovereign governments
rated by Moody’s outside the US, from 129 in 2000 to 443 in 2017. The combination of good creditworthiness of sub-
sovereign bonds, coupled with higher yields vis-à-vis sovereign bonds, partially explains this trend (Vetter and Zipfel, 2014).
Our paper contributes to studies exploring biases in credit ratings. Our aim is to explore whether CRAs display a bias
towards cities and regions with strong financial centre characteristics. Particularly at the sovereign level, several papers have
pointed out the existence of cultural biases in credit ratings. Fuchs and Gehring (2017), for example, find that CRAs tend to
give ratings about a notch higher to countries they are culturally familiar with, particularly in terms of language. To the best
of our knowledge, however, no one has addressed the question of credit rating bias at the sub-sovereign scale. In addition, we
are aware of no article examining the hypothesis that CRAs might be positively predisposed towards financial centres. This is
a major research gap which we aim to address.
The lack of interest in financial centres is particularly surprising, given their centrality in the global economy. Financial
centres have the capacity to provide households and firms with access to deep, liquid and sophisticated financial markets,
and serve as information-intensive hubs for financial and advanced business services firms. These firms serve as protagonists
in large financial transactions, such as new issues of equity and bond securities, syndicated loans or mergers and acquisi-
tions. The combination of prior research demonstrating the significance of cultural familiarity for sovereign ratings and
the fact that CRAs are important tenants of financial centres is in itself a good reason to ask, whether CRAs are biased towards
sub-sovereign issuers that host financial centres.
Our analysis covers a sample of 259 localities from 39 countries, based on Moody’s ratings. For our purposes, we utilise a
random-effects panel ordered probit model. We employ a variety of proxies for measuring the importance of finance in a city
or region. First, as with other empirical studies on financial centres (e.g. Degl’Innocenti et al., 2018a, 2018b), we consider the
Z/Yen Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI). In addition to this, we utilise the local share of employment in finance and busi-
ness services, and the position of a city as a hub for investment banking. Summarised briefly, our results indicate that regard-
less of measurement, Moody’s ratings are indeed favourably biased towards areas which have strong financial centre
characteristics. They also confirm the overarching influence of the country’s sovereign credit rating as a determinant of
sub-sovereign ratings. Additionally, they corroborate previous findings on rating biases, linked with cultural familiarity
and geopolitical ties with the US (Fuchs and Gehring, 2017; Yalta and Yalta, 2018).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature on sub-sovereign ratings, focusing on
their quantitative and qualitative determinants. We also examine the existing works on credit rating biases, and the litera-
ture on financial centres. In Section 3 we discuss our methodological approach, outlining in detail our selection of data and
our econometric approach. In Section 4 we present our results together with a set of robustness checks. We also reflect on
some of the most important implications of the detected ‘financial centre bias’. In the concluding section of the paper we
summarise our key findings and discuss implications for theory and policy.Fig. 1. Sub-sovereign debt and ratings outside the US. Source: Dealogic and Moody’s (2019a).
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2.1. Determinants of sub-sovereign ratings
According to Moody’s most recent methodology report (Moody’s, 2018), there are two sets of factors that determine sub-
sovereign ratings: the idiosyncratic factors of a given locality; and the broader macroeconomic environment, including the
willingness and capacity of a central government to support lower levels of government.
Moody’s considers idiosyncratic factors of sub-sovereign governments by using a scorecard with four groups of variables:
economic fundamentals, fiscal and financial performance, institutional framework, and quality of governance. Typical mea-
sures of economic fundamentals and fiscal performance include local GDP per capita, unemployment, fiscal deficit and debt
to GDP. The institutional framework covers regulations associated with local governments’ discretion over spending and
their revenue-raising powers.
The overarching macroeconomic environment is primarily captured by the country’s sovereign rating. Some of the most
important factors reflected in it are the fiscal and monetary policy of the central government, country-level economic fun-
damentals, as well as variables associated with financial stability (for Moody’s sovereign rating methodology see Moody’s
(2019b); for supporting macroeconomic literature also see Cantor and Packer, 1996 or Afonso et al., 2011). Besides the ability
of a central government to support lower tiers of government (reflected particularly in its own fiscal imbalance and debt to
GDP ratio), Moody’s also considers the government’s legal constraints in aiding regions and municipalities in financial dis-
tress, along with its history and reputation of doing so.
Moody’s (2019a) provides up-to-date evidence on the critical role of sovereign ratings in the determination of sub-
sovereign ratings. As documented in their report, in the vast majority of cases sovereign ratings provide a solid upper-
limit to sub-sovereign ratings (2019a: 10). The few existing exceptions to this rule tend to relate to countries in which
regions enjoy a high degree of political and fiscal autonomy, for example the Basque Country in Spain. Moody’s also docu-
ments that all non-US sub-sovereign defaults since 1983 have coincided with sovereign defaults (e.g. Russia, 1998; Argentina
from 2001 to 2014; Ukraine, 2015).
Albeit few in number, econometric studies have contributed to identifying the key determinants of sub-sovereign ratings.
Cheung (1996) investigates S&P’s ratings of Canadian provinces. According to her analysis, provincial debt to GDP, employ-
ment rate, the size of provinces, federal transfers and unemployment benefits are all significant in determining provincial
credit ratings. Sabourin (1999) also investigates the credit ratings of Canadian provinces and discovers non-linearities in
the impact of local debt. More recently, Gaillard (2009) studies Moody’s ratings for a large group of non-US regions and cities
and uncovers that sovereign rating scores, GDP per capita and net direct debt are statistically significant predictors of sub-
sovereign credit ratings. Jannone-Bellot et al. (2017) investigate sub-sovereign credit ratings in Europe and identify local
population growth, unemployment rate, regional public spending, capital expenditures, as well as the relative size of an area
(measured in terms of its population share) as additional determinants. Furthermore, Liu and Sun (2016) highlight the pos-
itive role of a country’s economic and financial openness.2.1.1. The significance of qualitative judgement
Moody’s (2018) acknowledges that its credit ratings are also informed by qualitative considerations. This holds for all
types of ratings of private and public sector issuers, and is common across the rating industry, including the big-three CRAs
(see for instance S&P, 2020). Nonetheless, public finance, and particularly the sub-sovereign domain, has been documented
as one in which qualitative judgement is most prominent. Omstedt (2020) shows this for sub-sovereign governments in the
US using semi-structured interviews with rating analysts. As one of his interviewees puts it, the corporate world ‘‘is easier
because it has fewer issuers and more harmonized financial reporting practices [. . .] Munis [aka municipal bonds] don’t have
this uniformity and you need a lot more manpower and less computer analysis” (Omstedt, 2020: 8–9). In a similar vein,
another interviewee notes that CRAs cannot just plug in the numbers, since every state is governed by different laws and
practices (Omstedt, 2020: 9).
It only takes one step of logical extrapolation, to argue that in an international context this challenge of comparability,
and consequently the reliance on qualitative judgement must become even more pronounced. The significance of qualitative
judgement and hence discrepancies between what would be justified by quantitative variables and actual credit ratings
invites the investigation of behavioural biases in the process of credit rating.2.2. Behavioural biases in sovereign ratings
One of the first behavioural biases to be identified at the sovereign level was that of procyclicality (Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz,
1999; Vernazza and Nielsen, 2015; Ioannou, 2017). Writing in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, Ferri et al. (1999) sug-
gest that Moody’s, S&P and Fitch assigned overly optimistic credit ratings to countries in East Asia in the run-up to the crisis.
Subsequently, the three CRAs turned excessively conservative and downgraded crisis-hit countries like Malaysia and South
Korea more than what was justified by their economic fundamentals. Vernazza and Nielsen (2015) and Ioannou (2017) pro-
vide similar evidence in the context of the European crisis of 2010.3
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papers of this stream is Fuchs and Gehring (2017). Based on a sample of 143 countries, and covering nine CRAs in their anal-
ysis (including the big-three agencies), they uncover what they refer to as ‘home bias’, with CRAs assigning higher ratings to
their home countries (i.e. the countries of their headquarters) and, to a smaller extent, to other countries that are culturally
close to their home countries. The term bias is used as these differences in ratings cannot be justified by economic and polit-
ical fundamentals of the countries concerned. The bias is economically significant as the home country is on average
assigned a rating that is one rating category higher than that justified by fundamentals. In Fuchs and Gehring’s assessment,
cultural proximity (with linguistic similarity used as a key proxy variable) is the main channel of the ‘home bias’ since it
implies an easier, more favourable and optimistic interpretation of information, and enhances the level of trust that a sover-
eign government will repay its debts. Additionally, CRAs tend to assign higher ratings to countries in which home-country
banks hold large risk exposures. This might indicate a role of economic and political proximity in addition to cultural
proximity.
Further evidence on home bias is provided in Yalta and Yalta (2018). According to their findings, the three big CRAs do
indeed provide inflated ratings to their home country, the US. They also seem to provide higher ratings to countries with
considerable trade and military relationships with the United States. On the other hand, Yalta and Yalta’s (2018) evidence
shows that apart from the US-bias, no particular group of countries is discriminated against by CRAs. Altdörfer et al.
(2019) add further nuance on ‘home bias’ by investigating the ratings of Fitch. Given the French co-ownership of the agency
by a risk management company called FIMALAC at the time of the European crisis, and the fact that Fitch has dual headquar-
ters in New York City and London, the authors treat it as relatively more European CRA, compared to S&P and Moody’s. Con-
sistent with the ‘home bias’ hypothesis, Altdörfer et al. (2019) find that Fitch issued more favourable sovereign ratings than
the other two agencies for Eurozone economies during the crisis.2.3. Financial centres and sub-sovereign ratings
When we combine evidence on ‘home bias’ in sovereign ratings with the observation that in sub-sovereign ratings qual-
itative judgment plays an equally, if not more important role than it does in sovereign ratings, we ought to consider the
potential for behavioural biases in sub-sovereign ratings. In this paper, we propose and test the existence of a ‘financial cen-
tre bias’ in sub-sovereign ratings. In short, we expect that cities and sub-national regions that have strong financial centre
characteristics, are assigned higher ratings than would be justified by their economic and political fundamentals. To contex-
tualise this proposition, we start with some key observations on financial centres, and features that give a city or region a
financial centre character.
Financial centres have been defined as spatial concentrations of financial and business services (FABS) firms, including
law, accounting, marketing and management consulting (Coe et al., 2014; Sassen, 2001). The inclusion of business services
other than finance, insurance and real estate is crucial for the definition. If we think about major financial transactions such
as an initial public offering or a corporate merger/acquisition, such deals involve lawyers, accountants and management con-
sultants in addition to bankers, all working in close collaboration with customers and each other. As such, financial centres
represent large pools of mostly highly-skilled and highly-paid labour. FABS have been one of the fastest growing economic
sectors for several decades, recently recording fastest growth in emerging economies (Cassis and Wójcik, 2018).
The existence of financial centres can be explained by an interplay of centripetal and centrifugal forces (Grote, 2008;
Engelen and Grote, 2009; Degl’Innocenti et al., 2017). Centripetal forces can be divided into localisation and agglomeration
economies (McCann, 2001). Localisation economies involve benefits that accrue to FABS firms that locate close to each other,
as co-location allows them to share a large and deep labour market, infrastructure, and crucially, information, which in turn
facilitates innovation, collaboration and competition. Agglomeration economies concern benefits of locating in large cities, in
proximity to large pools of corporate clients, government agencies, specialised suppliers from beyond the FABS sector (e.g. IT
firms), big-city infrastructure (such as international airports), and amenities improving the quality of life (like theatres and
museums). As information is the primary input for finance and FABS more generally, financial centres operate as information
hubs, reducing information asymmetries, while allowing firms and individuals to combine local with global information and
interpret it. Local information can relate to a particular locally-headquartered company or a locally-based asset. Global infor-
mation involves the ability to understand global political and economic trends and patterns. The intensity of information and
knowledge exchange through competition, collaboration and innovation in financial centres helps build tacit knowledge and
trust, which cannot be easily created or transferred across distance (Amin and Thrift, 1992).
Corporate and particularly retail customers of FABS are found in multiple locations scattered across the economic land-
scape, and hence the need for being close to them, is a major centrifugal force explaining the multiplicity of financial centres
(Clark and O’Connor, 1997). Another significant centrifugal force involves diseconomies of agglomeration, with high labour
and office costs, and congestion pressures on infrastructure in the lead (Taylor et al., 2003). Decentralised political structures,
present particularly in federal countries, tend to protect local and regional FABS firms and their interests, thus acting as
another centrifugal force (Verdier, 2002). Technology is a double-edged sword for financial centres. On the one hand it allows
leading financial centres to have a larger spatial reach, by facilitating the collection of information from a larger area. On the
other hand, it enables the unbundling of the value chains in FABS, whereby back-office, mid-office and various types of front-
office activities can be located in different places (Haberly et al., 2019).4
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professionals and capital through financial centres (Taylor and Derudder, 2015). These flows describe the high degree of
complementarity between financial centres. Faulconbridge (2004), for example, describes how the launch of the Euro pro-
duced an increased connectivity between Frankfurt with London. In a similar fashion, Karreman and van der Knaap (2009)
note that the rise of Shanghai in the 1990s and the 2000s gave rise to a complementary relationship with Hong Kong, with a
distinct sectoral specialisation and geographical scope of each centre; whereas Shanghai obtained a more prominent role in
dealing with domestic companies from traditional industries, such as mining and utilities, Hong Kong remained the main
centre for large Chinese companies with an international reach, particularly from information-intensive industries, such
as financials and telecommunications.
At the same time, financial centres remain deeply hierarchical, with dominance of cities such as New York and London, or
else what Cassis describes as capitals of capital, at the very top (Cassis, 2006). A number of scholars point out that prior to the
crisis of 2007/08, the dominance of New York and London was consolidated even more, despite changes in the rankings of
second- and third-tier centres (Poon, 2003; Engelen, 2007; Engelen and Grote, 2009; Engelen et al., 2010). Engelen and Grote
(2009), for example, describe how the internationalisation of finance, and the introduction of virtual trading, led to the par-
tial decline in the importance of Amsterdam in the 2000s, and correspondingly to the further strengthening of London, which
stood to attract a significant part of Dutch financial activity. Following the crisis, New York and London have maintained
their positions at top of the hierarchy, despite their protagonist role in causing the crisis at the first place (Wójcik, 2013).
Both cities have occupied the top two positions in the Z/Yen Global Financial Centres Index since the institute’s first report
in 2007 (source: Z/Yen Institute’s website). In investment banking- a core area of financial activity- New York and London
have remained the two leading hubs for over a century, despite the recent growth of financial centres in Asia (Wójcik et al.,
2019).
Financial centres’ hierarchy is related closely to their connectivity and types of financial and related services they offer to
their customers. Financial centres can to some extent specialise in different types of FABS services and in different parts of
the value chain. Smaller financial centres typically focus on basic financial services for retail customers and small and med-
ium sized businesses and have only local or regional market scope. The largest financial centres, such as New York and Lon-
don, are diversified, have large and deep FABS labour pools, and serve global markets. As many of the largest financial
transactions for corporate customers and governments, such as IPOs, debt issuance and syndication, and M&As are the realm
of investment banking, the leading financial centres are typically the largest centres of investment banking industry (Wójcik
et al., 2019). The latter hosts many of the best paid professionals in the whole FABS sector.
Financial centre characteristics discussed above are important, as they help us prepare the ground for explaining why we
expect a financial centre bias in sub-sovereign credit ratings, which is conceptually related to the ‘home bias’ documented for
sovereign ratings. Just as Fuchs and Gehring (2017) build their argument on the ‘home bias’ in sovereign ratings on the lit-
erature on ‘home-biases’ in investment decisions, bank lending behaviour and trade, we draw from research on ‘financial
centre biases’ in economics, regional science and economic geography. In primary capital markets, Wójcik (2009) shows that
companies from leading financial centres are more likely to go public than companies from other areas of their respective
countries, while Wójcik and Burger (2010) demonstrate that firms from leading financial centres are more likely to cross-
list their shares on foreign exchanges. As for secondary capital markets, there is a rich literature documenting a ‘local bias’
in investment decisions (Ivković and Weisbrenner, 2005; Loughran and Schultz, 2004). Coval and Mosckowitz (1999), for
example, show that approximately one in ten companies in a fund manager’s portfolio is chosen because it is located in
the same city as the manager. Since financial centres are concentrations of fund management industry, the ‘local bias’ thus
translates into a ‘financial centre bias’.
Research on ‘local bias’ in capital markets is part and parcel of literature on the uneven access to finance across space. As
Klagge and Martin (2005: 394) argue, within a financial system of a country it is common to find ‘‘over-accumulation of
credit (i.e. debt) and investment in one period, sector of the economy, or geographical location, and under-accumulation
in others”. Small firms in economically lagging regions in particular often struggle to access funding due to their distance
from leading financial centres (Ioannou and Wójcik, 2020). Distance can aggravate information asymmetries between bor-
rowers and lenders, leading to higher transaction and monitoring costs, and introduce biases in the way the latter perceive
the former and their creditworthiness (Martin and Pollard, 2017). In addition, there is research showing the tendency of sav-
ings in peripheral regions to bypass local banks and flow towards leading financial centres, which offer more attractive
investment opportunities in terms of rate of return and risk (Verdier, 2002). One could also anticipate periods of crisis to
amplify these inequalities. Degl’Innocenti et al. (2018b), for example, describe how over the period of the global financial
crisis, European regions hosting financial centres converged in their competitiveness with one another, while at the same
time diverging further from other regions in their countries.
Building on the literature on biases that exist in financial markets at sub-national level, we expect the main channel of
‘financial centre bias’ in sub-sovereign ratings to be cultural proximity. Financial centres are the ‘home’ and ‘natural habitat’
of rating agencies, with which these agencies and their professionals are more familiar than with other cities and regions. An
indicative example of CRAs’ locational preferences, is the fact that 27 of the 30 international offices of Moody’s are located in
cities included in the Z/Yen Global Financial Centres Index (source: Moody’s website; Yeandle and Wardle, 2019).22 The three exceptions are Moody’s offices in Limassol, Cyprus, and in Bangalore and Gurgaon in India.
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tres, and their professionals are an integral part of the FABS labour force and social environment, they may be more opti-
mistic about the economic prospects of financial centres compared to what economic fundamentals would suggest about
these prospects. Additionally, they may presume that public administrations in financial centres have a better understanding
of the complex financial instruments they use, as compared to other cities, due to their immersion in a financial centre. As a
result, they may believe that these administrations have the knowledge and expertise required for achieving and/or main-
taining sustainable debt profiles. Put counterfactually, Dodd (2010) indicates that it was precisely this lack of expertise that
caused financial distress to numerous municipalities in the US and in Europe throughout the 2007/08 financial crisis. Accord-
ing to his testimony, ‘‘complex derivatives transactions on both sides of the Atlantic have resulted in crippling financial
losses for local governments [. . .] these deals usually involved unsophisticated local governments [. . .] [which once intro
trouble] became susceptible to greater dangers as they traded more complex or exotic- and riskier- derivatives to recoup
their losses” (Dodd, 2010: 33). In summary, just as familiarity breeds optimism, trust and investment in financial markets
(Huberman, 2001), and as it leads to ‘home bias’ in sovereign ratings, we expect familiarity to lead to higher sub-
sovereign ratings assigned to cities and regions with strong financial centre characteristics.
3. Data and methodology
Our sample covers a total of 259 localities, across 39 countries, and runs from2004 to 2017 (all localities listed in the appen-
dix). About half of our sample consists of urban areas. All countries but Ukraine are classified as either uppermiddle income or
high income by theWorld Bank. Moreover, 14 countries have a federal system of governance. Mexico is the largest country in
terms of coverage (71 locations), and Europe is the continent with the largest number of countries in the sample (25).
Our main source of data is Moody’s statistical handbook on regional and municipal governments outside the US (Moody’s,
2005).3 This is, to the best of our knowledge, the richest source of standardised cross-county economic data for sub-sovereign
governments. The handbook contains all the local demographic, economic, and financial variables Moody’s considers in its pro-
duction of sub-sovereign ratings. The richness of data is also why we concentrate on Moody’s ratings rather than those of Stan-
dard and Poor’s or Fitch.
Moody’s coverage shapes the temporal and geographic dimensions of our panel.4 Despite the unique richness of the Moo-
dy’s dataset, it is natural to expect a bias of representation in our sample, given that the only localities included are those rated
by Moody’s. A stylised fact stated by Moody’s itself is that most of the rated sub-sovereigns are located in investment-grade
countries (2019a: 2).
Other city-level data resources used in our paper are the Oxford Economics Global Cities 2030 database and Dealogic.
Oxford Economics offers city-level macroeconomic, sectoral and demographic data (Oxford Economics, 2014).5 Dealogic pro-
vides a rich source of granular data on investment banking transactions, including underwriting of equity and debt securities
(corporate and government bonds), syndicated loans, and advisory services on mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
Credit rating is a discrete alphanumerical variable reflecting a rating agency’s expectation of default of a given entity.
Given its discrete nature, the typical linear panel data approach is not applicable (Fry et al., 1993; Wooldridge, 2001). We
therefore opt for a random-effects panel ordered probit model, a choice also in accordance with the well-established econo-
metric tradition in credit rating modelling (e.g. Gaillard, 2009; Afonso et al., 2011; Jannone-Bellot et al., 2017). Effectively,
this is a generalisation of the simple probit model, where instead of two we have n possible outcomes, corresponding to






correspyit ¼ bXit1 þ cDi þ dwi þ ui þ eit ð1Þ
where yit is an unobserved latent variable; Xit is the vector of time-varying control variables; Di is the vector of time-
invariant measurements; wi is our proxy for financial centre characteristics in a given area (also in a time-invariant form);
b, c, d are the corresponding sets of parameter values; ui  N 0;r2u
 
is the location-specific effect; and eit  N 0;1ð Þ is the
model’s standard error. Tomatch the values of yit with discrete rating scores, we utilise 20 cutting points (i.e. n 1) as follows:yit ¼
Aaa if yit > j20




Ca if j1 < yit  j2
C if yit  j1
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
ð2Þer rating agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s provide snapshots of their analyses but not detailed spreadsheets, as in the case of Moody’s. Moody’s
is proprietary and in principle available upon payment, but free access can be granted on request for using the data for academic purposes.
s is also why the US is not included in our sample. As categorised by Moody’s, US sub-sovereign bonds are treated as a separate asset category, with a
t methodology and availability of data (source: Moody’s website).
limitation in our analysis is thatOxford Economics andMoody’s donotdefineurban areas in identicalways. Specifically,Moody’s defines areas on thebasis
jurisdictions of rated governments, whereas Oxford Economics also considers the broader metropolitan areas of a city. Although not ideal, we expect the
ondence between the two to be strong enough for the purpose of our paper, given that banks and other business services are usually found in central areas.
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example, is stated as follows:6 In Y
(2018:
countri
recordePr j19 < bXit1 þ cDi þ dwi þ ui þ eit  j20ð Þ ¼ U j20  bXit1  cDi  dwi  uið Þ
U j19  bXit1  cDi  dwi  uið Þ ð3Þwhere UðÞ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function (for further elaboration see Wooldridge, 2001,
chapter 15). The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. To protect the model against simultaneous
endogeneity, all time-varying regressors are lagged by one year.
To enable our econometric analysis, we convert Moody’s ratings into a numerical format. In our conversion every
alphanumerical category is matched with one number. The higher the number, the higher the rating, e.g. Aaa ¼ 21,
Aa1 ¼ 20 and so on (for full listing see the lower part of table 1). An alternative numerical conversion, with bottom ratings
pooled together into one category, is saved as a robustness check (see discussion below). For deciding which control vari-
ables to include in the time-varying vector Xit we follow the recent most cited papers on the determinants of sub-
sovereign ratings (Gaillard, 2009; Jannone-Bellot et al., 2017), as well as Moody’s own methodology reports (Moody’s,
2005; 2018). First and foremost, we take into account the overarching sovereign rating of every locality. This is consistently
reported as highly significant and positive in econometric literature and is emphatically highlighted as a crucial factor by
Moody’s itself. To this we add local GDP per capita (+), net debt (), unemployment rate (), gross operating balance (current
revenues minus current expenditures and interest payments; +) and capital spending (+). (In brackets we show the expected
sign for coefficients related to each of these variables.)
We also tried some alternative specifications offered by Moody’s, given the availability of the data. Specifically, we tried to
run our model with net instead of gross operating balance, wherein principal payments are also included in expenditures;
and with total debt instead of net debt. In all cases results are highly consistent with what reported in the econometric
Tables 3 And 4 below. One of the reasons for choosing which specifications to include were Moody’s own remarks.
Moody’s (2005: 7), for example, calls for caution in the use of net operating balance, given the potential irregularity in debt
maturity profiles. Similarly, Moody’s (2005: 4) points out that net debt is a more appropriate descriptor of creditworthiness
than total debt, as it relates more closely to the taxpayer-supported part of local government debt (precise definition can be
found in Table 1). Other variables in the Moody’s dataset turned out to be insignificant (e.g. discretionary own source rev-
enue; and share of short-term debt).
Out of time-invariant controls, we utilise the share of an area in the total population of a country, the country’s legal ori-
gins as well as the US military presence in the country. The share of population is used as a proxy for the size of a city or
region, based on the hypothesis that size might positively influence credit ratings, e.g. due to the higher capacity of an area
to diversify its economic activity and achieve economies of scale (Jannone-Bellot et al., 2017). The consideration of a coun-
try’s legal framework is based on the legal indicators database of La Porta et al. (1998) and is in line with research showing
that credit ratings are biased in favour of countries culturally and institutionally similar to the home country of the CRA
(Fuchs and Gehring, 2017; Yalta and Yalta, 2018). As constructed here, this variable takes the value of one for countries with
a legal system of English origin, and zero otherwise. Naturally, we would expect it to exhibit a positive sign. The consider-
ation of US military presence follows the evidence presented in Yalta and Yalta (2018), and the observation that a US-based
CRA (Moody’s in our case) might tend to favour countries with strong geopolitical ties with the US.6 Other variables we exper-
imented with were the English-speaking part of a country’s population (based on Wikipedia data); and the share of a country in
US’s total exports (based on data from the US Census Bureau). While meaningful economically, both variables exhibit a corre-
lation of about 80% with legal origins. Additionally, the ‘share in US exports’ variable turned out to be insignificant when
included in the model in place of legal origins.
To capture the financial centre characteristics of a city or region, we design five different variables. First, as with other
empirical studies on financial centres (e.g. Degl’Innocenti et al., 2018a, 2018b), we consider Z/Yen Global Financial Centres
Index (GFCI). This is an index published bi-annually, which evaluates the competitiveness of cities as global financial centres,
and ranks them on the basis of a five-dimensional scorecard: quality of business environment, human capital, infrastructure,
financial sector development, and reputation (Yeandle and Wardle, 2019). It includes 134 instrumental factors based on sec-
ondary data, combined with more than three thousand questionnaires, completed by financial services professionals around
the world. Examples of instrumental factors include tax and cost competitiveness, quality of life and cultural diversity. We
construct two alternative variables based on the GFCI. In the first we apply the GFCI identifier in a strict sense, flagging only
cities that have a global financial centres index (1 if a city has an index; 0 otherwise). In the second, we include the first set of
cities plus the broader regions that include such cities (e.g. Bavaria; Ile-de-France). All locations matched with the GFCI are
shown in italics in the appendix. Those considered in the first specification are also underlined.
As a second variable capturing financial centre characteristics, we use the share of employment in financial and business
services (FABS) in the total employment of a metropolitan area, based on the Global Cities 2030 database of Oxfordalta and Yalta (2018) geopolitical ties are captured by a dummy which takes the value of 1 for countries with active US military personnel deployed
686). Although we use the same database as these authors (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2019), we found it difficult to draw a distinction between
es with active US military forces and countries without, for the reason that all countries register some US military presence (12 people are for instance
d in Russia). We therefore separate between countries on the basis of the actual number of US military personnel, taken in natural logarithmic form.
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Table 1
Summary statistics, description of variables and numerical credit rating scale.
Variable Description Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sub-sovereign ratings 1–21 scale Moody’s 2715 13.85 4.84 1 21
sovereign ratings 1–21 scale Moody’s 3599 15.83 4 1 21
GDP per capita (ln.) In USD; natural logarithm Moody’s 2979 9.77 0.98 7.41 15.9
Net Debt to Op.
Revenue
Net debt equals total direct and
guaranteed debt minus debt covered
by dedicated financial assets (e.g.
sinking fund assets) and debt related
to state-owned enterprises deemed
by Moody’s to be financially self-
supporting; divided by operating
revenues
Moody’s 3059 69.28 75.14 0 567.9
Unemployment rate Percentage rate Moody’s 3019 7.52 5.51 0 36.6
Gross Operating
Balance
Operating (current) revenues minus
operating expenditures and interest
payments; divided by operating
revenue
Moody’s 3070 7.63 11.69 44 81.2
Capital Spending Ratio of total expenditure Moody’s 3056 18.01 11.38 0.5 74.5
Share of population Percentage share out of country total Moody’s 3626 5.21 8.22 0.06 57.51
Legal_English 1 if legal origins of the country are
English; 0 otherwise
La Porta et al.
(1998)
3626 0.19 0.39 0 1
US military (ln.) No. of military personnel (includes
army, navy, marine corps, air force




3626 5.19 2.65 1.10 10.92
GFC1 1 if city is included in the global
financial centre index; 0 otherwise
Yeandle and
Wardle (2019)
3626 0.08 0.28 0 1
GFC2 Equals to GFC1, plus broader areas




3626 0.15 0.36 0 1
FABS employment
share
The percentage share of employment
in FABS in total employment; as
defined by Oxford Economics, FABS
includes financial and insurance
activities, real estate activities,
professional, scientific & technical
activities and administrative &
support service sectors.
Oxford Economics 966 13.74 4.97 5.75 25
IB1 Investment banking fees income by
city (USD, 2010); in natural
logarithm. Added up based on the
location of the fee earning institution.
Zero values for areas for which
Dealogic does not report any data.
Dealogic 3626 0.45 1.31 0.77 8.31
IB2 Equals to IB1, but also takes into
account broader areas that include
cities that record investment banking
fees. Sum of cities if more than one in
a given area.
Dealogic 3626 0.91 1.88 1.3 8.31

















Aaa 21 A3 15 Ba3 9 Caa3 3
Aa1 20 Baa1 14 B1 8 Ca 2
Aa2 19 Baa2 13 B2 7 C 1
Aa3 18 Baa3 12 B3 6
A1 17 Ba1 11 Caa1 5
A2 16 Ba2 10 Caa2 4
S. Ioannou, D. Wójcik and Vladimír Pažitka J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 70 (2021) 101261Economics (OE). The focus on FABS, rather than finance alone, is compatible with our earlier discussion on financial centres
and the observation that business services tend to co-locate and work together with big banks and other financial institu-
tions.7 The variable is taken in a time-invariant form, given our purpose to use it as a spatial descriptor. One constraint of








































Net Debt to Op.
Revenue
0.40 0.34 0.40 1.00
Unemployment
rate
0.16 0.17 0.02 0.18 1.00
Gross Operating
Balance
0.06 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.19 1.00
Capital
Spending
0.02 0.06 0.19 0.20 0.09 0.62 1.00
share of
population
0.10 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.21 0.13 1.00
Legal English 0.44 0.46 0.21 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.02 1.00
US military (ln.) 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.72 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.32 0.08 1.00
GFC1 0.17 0.02 0.28 0.14 0.02 0.21 0.08 0.31 0.13 0.14 1.00




0.39 0.22 0.41 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.02 0.32 0.44 0.11 0.58 0.58 1.00
IB1 0.34 0.22 0.35 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.23 0.32 0.04 0.74 0.74 0.71 1.00



















Dependent variable: Sub-sovereign credit rating (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sovereign credit rating 0.680*** 0.657*** 0.659*** 0.659*** 0.705*** 0.658*** 0.657***
(12.506) (12.228) (12.273) (12.298) (8.032) (12.282) (12.258)
GDP per capita (ln.) 0.271* 0.195 0.178 0.181 0.202 0.184 0.187
(1.904) (1.509) (1.358) (1.388) (0.835) (1.399) (1.435)
Net Debt to Op. Revenue 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.008***
(-3.400) (-4.076) (-4.072) (-4.040) (-1.026) (-4.112) (-4.113)
Unemployment rate 0.096*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.122*** 0.106*** 0.105***
(-4.609) (-5.704) (-5.709) (-5.616) (-3.219) (-5.715) (-5.603)
Gross Operating Balance 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(4.271) (4.355) (4.331) (4.368) (2.615) (4.357) (4.379)
Capital Spending 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.015* 0.023*** 0.024***
(4.464) (4.720) (4.610) (4.628) (1.783) (4.592) (4.691)
Share of population 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.077** 0.114*** 0.103***
(5.482) (5.611) (4.557) (2.523) (5.499) (4.977)
Legal_English 3.573*** 3.551*** 3.464*** 1.201 3.494*** 3.433***
(6.751) (6.811) (6.818) (1.279) (6.740) (6.542)
US military (ln.) 0.536*** 0.545*** 0.533*** 0.432*** 0.534*** 0.513***











Observations 2466 2466 2466 2466 695 2466 2466
Number of locations 259 259 259 259 69 259 259
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; t-statistics in parentheses; heteroskedasticity robust errors and random
effects used in all cases; xtoprobit routine in STATA; GFC1 and GFC2 are based on financial centre index of Yeandle and Wardle (2019); FABS employment
share represents the share of employment in financial and business services out of total employment; IB variables describe fee revenues from investment
banking. FABS and IB variables in full-time averages for each location. Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Moody’s Statistics, Oxford
Economics and Dealogic.
S. Ioannou, D. Wójcik and Vladimír Pažitka J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 70 (2021) 101261for 69 metropolitan areas out of the 259 locations in our sample. This limitation, however, also gives us the opportunity to test
our results on a smaller size sample, and therefore serves as a robustness test too.8
Third, we use Dealogic’s data on investment banking fees, aggregated at the city level, based on the location of the fee
earning firm. The dataset has a global scope and covers more than 900,000 transactions, from 2000 to 2015. One of its lim-
itations is that whereas the deal value is available for an absolute majority of deals, actual fees are reported for only approx-
imately 20% of the transactions.9 Moreover, fees as a percentage of deal value vary significantly, ranging from less than 0.5% for
underwriting of debt securities to more than 7% for underwriting of initial public offerings of equity securities. To address this
missing data problem, we follow the approach developed in Wójcik et al. (2019) and model percentage fees as a function of deal
characteristics. We then use the predicted values of these models for filling in the gaps in our dataset. This allows us to mean-
ingfully aggregate investment banking activity. In cases where the locations of the bank subsidiaries involved in a transaction
are missing, we manually collect the addresses of their operational headquarters, based on Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis, Nexis UK
and Bloomberg.10
We construct two alternative specifications. First, we match our dataset of investment banking revenue only with the
cities for which data is available (44 cities covered in total). Second, we construct a broader specification wherein regions
that include cities under Dealogic’s coverage are also taken into account. Given the comprehensive nature of Dealogic data-
bases, we treat any cities or regions without any investment banking as true zeros, rather than missing data. As with FABS
employment share, the two variables are considered in a time-invariant form.
Table 1 reports all summary statistics of the variables utilised in our paper and provides their detailed definitions. It also
maps the correspondence between actual credit ratings and their numerical conversions. Table 2 contains the corresponding
correlation matrix.8 Another limitation is that our data from Oxford Economics only goes up to 2015, and hence the full-time averaging omits the two most recent years of our
sample.
9 Deal value equals funds raised in primary issues of equity or debt securities, lent through syndicated loans or the price paid in an M&A.
10 To make this task feasible, we selected the top 500 bank subsidiaries for each year/deal combination, yielding 7458 unique names. This sample covers more




Robustness test 1: alternative numerical scale for credit ratings Robustness test 2: regressions for the post crisis period (2010–2017)
Dependent variable: Sub-sovereign credit rating (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sovereign rating 0.692*** 0.666*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.739*** 0.668*** 0.667*** 0.658*** 0.626*** 0.629*** 0.632*** 0.737*** 0.661*** 0.628***
(11.910) (11.672) (11.715) (11.737) (8.059) (11.725) (11.699) (11.299) (10.741) (10.749) (10.863) (6.836) (11.346) (10.796)
GDP per capita (ln.) 0.248* 0.172 0.155 0.158 0.175 0.161 0.164 1.807*** 1.321*** 1.277*** 1.254*** 0.905** 1.758*** 1.282***
(1.759) (1.323) (1.171) (1.200) (0.742) (1.214) (1.250) (7.866) (5.779) (5.570) (5.505) (2.143) (7.722) (5.668)
Net Debt to Op. Revenue 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002
(-2.872) (-3.553) (-3.547) (-3.516) (-0.705) (-3.582) (-3.586) (0.057) (-1.176) (-1.160) (-1.057) (0.314) (0.056) (-1.196)
Unemployment rate 0.098*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.137*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.023 0.015
(-4.770) (-5.881) (-5.876) (-5.780) (-4.068) (-5.886) (-5.771) (0.980) (-0.808) (-0.826) (-0.687) (-0.342) (0.952) (-0.714)
Gross Operating Balance 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.023* 0.019*** 0.019***
(4.329) (4.399) (4.375) (4.414) (2.580) (4.402) (4.423) (2.966) (2.745) (2.712) (2.740) (1.801) (2.934) (2.772)
Capital Spending 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.015* 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.010 0.021*** 0.023***
(4.348) (4.636) (4.525) (4.543) (1.870) (4.509) (4.609) (3.827) (4.094) (4.017) (3.988) (0.894) (3.706) (4.063)
Share of population 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.078** 0.114*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.076*** 0.071* 0.079***
(5.486) (5.609) (4.544) (2.570) (5.501) (4.995) (4.770) (4.779) (3.794) (1.937) (4.383)
Legal_English 3.561*** 3.538*** 3.451*** 1.164 3.482*** 3.423*** 4.015*** 4.026*** 3.945*** 2.827** 3.903***
(6.722) (6.783) (6.786) (1.205) (6.712) (6.520) (7.214) (7.244) (7.257) (2.124) (7.052)
US military (ln.) 0.529*** 0.538*** 0.526*** 0.419*** 0.527*** 0.507*** 0.319*** 0.330*** 0.321*** 0.330* 0.300***











Observations 2466 2466 2466 2466 695 2466 2466 1678 1678 1678 1678 474 1678 1678
Number of locations 259 259 259 259 69 259 259 256 256 256 256 67 256 256
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; t-statistics in parentheses; heteroskedasticity robust errors and random effects used in all cases; xtoprobit routine in STATA; GFC1
and GFC2 are based on financial centre index of Yeandle and Wardle (2019); FABS employment share represents the share of employment in financial and business services out of total employment; IB variables
describe fee revenues from investment banking. FABS and IB variables in full-time averages for each location; in robustness test 1 the rating scale is [1–17] is used for both sub-sovereign and sovereign ratings (17
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We begin with the correlation plots presented in Fig. 2, which display a visualisation of the positive association between
sub-sovereign ratings, FABS employment and investment banking revenue. In the upper part we plot the relationship
between ratings and FABS share of employment; in the lower that between ratings and revenues from investment banking.
As seen in the figure, a positive association is discernible in both cases, despite some difference in degree.
Table 3 displays our baseline econometric results. We present seven models, based on the econometric setup described in
the previous section. The first two columns consider the most basic configuration, with and without time-invariant measure-
ments. This is for contrasting purposes, and for establishing a consistent basis on which we can build adding proxies for
financial centre characteristics. We introduce these proxies one at a time, in columns 3–7.Fig. 2. Correlation between sub-sovereign ratings and selected variables. Notes: FABS for ‘financial and business services’, IB for ‘investment banking’; FABS
shares in %; investment banking revenues in natural logarithm; all variables in full-time averages. Source: Moody’s, Oxford Economics, Dealogic, and
authors’ elaboration.
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the variable to be significant at the 99% level, across all specifications, with a parameter value between 0.6 and 0.7 in most
cases. This is close to what is reported in previous research (see for instance Jannone-Bellot et al., 2017).
Furthermore, with the exception of GDP per capita, the statistical significance of which weakens in models 2–7, all other
time-varying measurements are highly significant in the majority of our specifications. All signs are as expected: GDP per
capita is positively associated with sub-sovereign ratings, net debt and unemployment have consistently negative coeffi-
cients, and those for gross operating balance and capital spending are always positive.
The positive relationship between population share and sub-sovereign ratings suggests that Moody’s seems to acknowl-
edge an economic advantage of large cities and regions. Sub-sovereign governments in countries with English common law
legal system origin get higher credit ratings. This is consistent with Fuchs and Gehring’ (2017) and Yalta and Yalta’ (2018)
results on ’home bias’ in Moody’s ratings, as having English legal origins can be considered a form of cultural and institu-
tional proximity to the US, the home country of Moody’s. US military presence also has a positive and significant impact,
corroborating Yalta and Yalta’s (2018) findings. All else the same, cities and regions located in countries with substantial
geopolitical ties with the US tend to receive more favourable ratings by Moody’s.
Models 3–7 demonstrate that all proxies for financial centres are positively and statistically significantly (with signifi-
cance ranging between 95% and 99%) related to sub-sovereign credit ratings. According to models 3 and 4, cities included
in the GFCI tend to receive ratings about a rating category higher than what would be expected based on economic funda-
mentals. Similarly, model 5 indicates that the higher the average share of employment in FABS in a city or region, the higher
its rating. Moreover, models 6 and 7 confirm that areas with large presence of investment banking are more likely to receive
a higher rating by Moody’s.
4.1. Robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we conduct two additional exercises. First, we re-run the models in Table 3
using an alternative numerical conversion for credit ratings. Second, we repeat our main regressions for the part of our sam-
ple that corresponds to the post-crisis period (2010–2017). All results are presented in Table 4.
With regard to the first exercise, Alfonso et al. (2007) suggest that a numerical scale in which bottom categories are
grouped together might allow for a more efficient estimation, given the relative scarcity of observations with low ratings.11
In line with this suggestion, we establish an alternative scale, wherein the bottom five rating scores of Moody’s are considered
jointly (Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca and C). This leaves us with 17 rating categories in total. As before, the higher the number, the higher
the credit rating, e.g. Aaa ¼ 17;Aa1 ¼ 16, etc. As for the second exercise, our primary aim is to protect against a potential struc-
tural break in our series, as well as to assess whether the crisis has had an impact on any of the biases identified in the analysis.
In their vast majority our results remain consistent with what we reported earlier. As shown on the left-hand side of
Table 4, the alteration of the numerical scale of ratings does not produce any notable divergence, either in parameter values
or in statistical significance. As for the second exercise, some reduction in statistical significance can be observed in certain
time-varying controls. Moreover, the first specification of the GFCI falls below the 90% significance level. The parameter val-
ues and significance of all other proxies for financial centres, however, remain similar to our baseline results (see the last four
columns of Table 4).12
4.2. Implications of the ‘financial centre bias’
There is ample evidence suggesting a significant impact of credit ratings on borrowing costs, particularly at the sovereign
level (see for instance Reisen and Maltzan, 1999; Gande and Parsley, 2005; Altdörfer et al., 2019). A direct implication of our
results, therefore, is that areas with strong financial centre characteristics are likely to enjoy lower borrowing costs than
what is justified by their actual fundamentals. This in itself can have a number of repercussions.
To begin with, as discussed earlier it is often the case that, due to information asymmetries and uncertainty, some areas
tend to attract a disproportionate amount of financial resources, while other areas struggle (Verdier, 2002; Klagge and
Martin, 2005; Degl’Innocenti et al., 2018b). In this context, more favourable ratings can widen and consolidate further an
economic gap between financial centres and their adjacent regions on one side, and the rest of the country on the other. Bet-
ter ratings can allow areas with strong financial centre characteristics to attract an even greater volume of capital flows, par-
ticularly from institutional investors, such as pension funds, required by law to invest in safe assets, typically above the
speculative rating grade (Ba1 in Moody’s scale). Aided by lower borrowing costs, this can enable local administrations to
boost their investment in infrastructure, such as transport and communication, business parks, industry incubators and
accelerators, as well as amenities, and in that way attract even more skilled human resources from the periphery of their
countries. Indirectly, the economic gap might increase further if the more favourable borrowing conditions for local admin-
istrations affect local businesses, for instance due to the creation of a more stable economic environment. Furthermore, the11 About 2.5% of our sample corresponds to observations with a credit rating of Caa1 or lower.
12 One issue we faced in the second exercise was that STATA was unable to perform the maximum likelihood estimation for model 6 due to the encountering
of a discontinuous region in the data. To overcome this difficulty, we reduced the size of the model by removing all time-invariant control variables and re-run
the model.
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tain healthy fundamentals due to rating agencies expecting them to do so. Or, to put it differently, less advantaged areas
might find it even harder to catch up in face of the uneven expectations of credit rating agencies. Another indirect way in
which the financial centre bias in credit rating might impact the regional and urban economic landscape of a country is
by making other areas imitate the growth strategy of financial centres - a strategy likely to be counter-productive, unless
based on a genuine understanding of local characteristics and advantages.5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the proposition that Moody’s sub-sovereign ratings might be biased in favour of areas that
exhibit strong financial centre characteristics. To test the proposition, we employ a large sample of sub-national areas from
39 countries and use a wide range of proxies for measuring financial centre characteristics. These are based on the Z/Yen
Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), the local share of employment in financial and business services sourced from Oxford
Economics, and the investment banking revenue earned from transactions underwritten in the city. These measures comple-
ment each other as they focus on the key dimensions of financial centres: their international competitiveness, size of the
relevant labour pool, and position in the one of the most strategically important and elite type of financial transactions.
Our results confirm our proposition, by presenting strong evidence for the existence of a ‘financial centre bias’ in sub-
sovereign ratings. This bias holds for all measures of financial centre characteristics considered here and withstands various
robustness checks.
Our results offer an important contribution to the literature on bias in credit ratings and financial markets more generally.
In particular, we extend findings on the existence of a ‘home bias’ in sovereign ratings to the sub-national level. In our view,
the ‘financial centre bias’ can be explained by cultural proximity. Just as sovereign ratings are biased towards countries that
are culturally close to the home country of the CRA producing the ratings, we argue that sub-sovereign ratings are biased
towards cities and regions with strong financial centre characteristics, which represent the ‘home’ and ‘natural habitat’ of
CRAs. What is more, the economic significance of this ‘financial centre bias’ is comparable to that of ‘home bias’ in sovereign
ratings. As with Fuchs and Gehring (2017) who find that on a 21-point scale, home country gets on average a rating one cat-
egory higher than what justified based on fundamentals, we also find that the inclusion of a city in the GFCI results in a rating
about a notch higher than what indicated by fundamentals.
The persistent influence of credit rating agencies in contemporary financial markets, and the continuing rise in the par-
ticipation of sub-national governments in global bond markets highlight the importance of our findings. Faced with an envi-
ronment of fiscal decentralisation, sub-national governments increasingly rely on private financing for covering their day-to-
day and long-term needs, including infrastructure. Nonetheless not all areas enter the market on the same terms. While
financial centres might already be in a position of receiving a disproportionate amount of human and financial resources
from the rest of their countries (Verdier, 2002; Klagge and Martin, 2005; Degl’Innocenti et al., 2018b), their favourable treat-
ment by rating agencies can further amplify their advantage, either directly or indirectly. Cheaper municipal borrowing,
facilitated by more favourable ratings, for example, can allow financial centres to invest more in high quality infrastructure,
such as transport and communication, business parks, industry incubators and accelerators, and other growth enhancing
assets.
There are two types of policy implications that stem from our analysis. First, CRAs should be forced to make their sub-
sovereign rating methodologies more transparent and predictable. Given the global interconnectedness of contemporary
bond markets such reform can best succeed if carried out by an institution of international governance, such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, or the Financial Stability Board of the G20. Secondly, national governments need to make regions and
cities less dependent on the judgement of CRAs. To this end they need to expand their fiscal support towards lower levels of
governance, e.g. by increasing earmarked grants for infrastructure development, and by providing them access to affordable
interest rates, particularly for the purpose of long-term investment. Such approach should also be matched with a coherent
and coordinated framework for economic development, where each region is encouraged to flourish based on its own dis-
tinct advantages.
One desirable extension of our work, subject to data availability, would be to test the existence of ‘financial centre bias’ in
the sub-sovereign ratings of other CRAs. Moreover, more research is needed in the direction of measuring the quantitative
impact of sub-sovereign credit ratings on local bond yields. Another direction for future research would be to identify par-
ticular aspects of cultural proximity that may drive the financial centre bias. In this regard, a combination of quantitative and
qualitative research, including interviews with credit rating analysts, would be recommendable. Finally, future work could
capture in a formal mathematical model the interactions between sub-sovereign ratings, borrowing costs, and their impli-
cations for urban development.Declaration of Competing Interest
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Appendix A. List of countries and locations (39 countries, 259 locations; in italics and underlined if identified by Z/Yen
as a global financial centre; solely in italics if an area with a global financial centre inside it).Country Location15Country LocationArgentina Buenos Aires, City of Mexico Centro, Municipality of (Villahermosa)
Argentina Buenos Aires, Province of Mexico Chiapas, State of
Argentina Chaco, Province of Mexico Chicoloapan de Juarez, Municipality of
Argentina Chubut, Province of Mexico Chihuahua, State of
Argentina Cordoba, Municipality of Mexico Ciudad de Mexico
Argentina Cordoba, Province of Mexico Coacalco, Municipality of
Argentina Formosa, Province of Mexico Coatzacoalcos, Municipality of
Argentina Mendoza, Province of Mexico Colima, Municipality of
Argentina Rio Cuarto, Municipality of Mexico Corregidora, Municipality of
Australia New South Wales (State of) Australia Mexico Cuautitlan Izcalli, Municipality of
Australia Northern Territory of Australia Mexico Cuautla, Municipality of
Australia Queensland (State of) Australia Mexico Culiacan, Municipality of
Australia South Australia (State of) Australia Mexico Durango, Municipality of
Australia Tasmania (State of) Australia Mexico Durango, State Of
Australia Victoria (State of) Australia Mexico Ecatepec de Morelos, Municipality of
Australia Western Australia (State of)
Australia
Mexico Guadalajara, Municipality ofAustria Carinthia, State of Mexico Guadalupe, Municipality of
Austria Lower Austria, State of Mexico Guanajuato, State of
Austria Vienna, City of Mexico Guasave, Municipality of
Belgium Flanders, the Community of Mexico Guerrero, State of
Belgium Walloon Region Mexico Hidalgo, State of
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Srpska, Republic of Mexico Ixtapaluca, Municipality ofBrazil Bahia, State of Mexico Jalisco, State of
Brazil Belo Horizonte, Municipality of Mexico Lazaro Cardenas, Municipality of
Brazil Maranhao, State of Mexico Leon, Municipality of
Brazil Minas Gerais, State of Mexico Matamoros, Municipality of
Brazil Parana, State of Mexico Merida, Municipality of
Brazil Rio de Janeiro, Municipality of Mexico Metepec, Municipality of
Brazil Sao Paulo, State of Mexico Mexicali, Municipality of
Canada Alberta, Province of Mexico Mexico, State of
Canada British Columbia, Province of Mexico Monterrey, Municipality of
Canada Durham, Regional Municipality of Mexico Morelos, State of
Canada Government of Nunavut Mexico Nicolas Romero, Municipality of
Canada Halton, Regional Municipality of Mexico Nogales, Municipality of
Canada London, City of Mexico Nuevo Leon, State of
Canada Manitoba, Province of Mexico Oaxaca de Juarez, Municipality of
Canada Montreal, City of Mexico Oaxaca, State of
Canada Muskoka, District Municipality of Mexico Puebla, State of
Canada New Brunswick, Province of Mexico Queretaro, Municipality of
Canada Newfoundland and Labrador,
Province of
Mexico Queretaro, State ofCanada North Bay, City of Mexico Ramos Arizpe, Municipality of
Canada Northwest Territories Mexico Reynosa, Municipality of(continued on next page)
S. Ioannou, D. Wójcik and Vladimír Pažitka J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 70 (2021) 101261Appendix A (continued)Country Location16Country LocationCanada Nova Scotia, Province of Mexico San Luis Potosi, State of
Canada Ontario, Province of Mexico San Luis Rio Colorado, Municipality of
Canada Ottawa, City of Mexico San Pedro Garza Garcia, Municipality of
Canada Peel, Regional Municipality of Mexico Sinaloa, State of
Canada Prince Edward Island, Province of Mexico Sonora, State of
Canada Quebec, City of Mexico Tabasco, State of
Canada Quebec, Province of Mexico Tamaulipas, State of
Canada Saskatchewan, Province of Mexico Tecamac, Municipality of
Canada St. John’s, City of Mexico Tlalnepantla, Municipality of
Canada Toronto, City of Mexico Tlaquepaque, Municipality of
Canada Vancouver, City of Mexico Tlaxcala, State of
Canada Waterloo, Regional Municipality of Mexico Toluca, Municipality of
Canada Winnipeg, City of Mexico Tuxpan, Municipality of (VeraCruz)
Canada Yellowknife, City of Mexico Tuxtla Gutierrez, Municipality of
Canada York, Regional Municipality of Mexico Uruapan, Municipality of
Colombia Bogota, Distrito Capital (Colombia) Mexico Valle de Chalco Solidaridad,
Municipality of
Colombia Medellin, City of Mexico Veracruz, State of
Croatia Zagreb, City of Mexico Zacatecas, Municipality of
Czech Republic Brno, City of Mexico Zacatecas, State of
Czech Republic Ceska Lipa, City of Mexico Zapopan, Municipality of
Czech Republic Klatovy, City of Mexico Zapotlan el Grande, Municipality of
Czech Republic Liberec, City of Mexico Zitacuaro, Municipality of
Czech Republic Liberec, Region of New Zealand Auckland Council
Czech Republic Moravian-Silesian, Region of Norway Oslo, City of
Czech Republic Ostrava, City of Peru Lima, Municipality of
Czech Republic Prague, City of Poland Olsztyn, City of
Czech Republic Prostejov, City of Poland Poznan, City of
Czech Republic South-Moravian Region Poland Starostwo Powiatowe w Zywcu
Czech Republic Trebic, City of Poland Warsaw, City of
Czech Republic Uherske Hradiste, City of Portugal Azores, Autonomous Region of
Czech Republic Usti, Region of Portugal Madeira, Autonomous Region Of
Czech Republic Zdar nad Sazavou, City of Portugal Sintra, City of
Denmark Faroe Islands, Government of Romania Alba Iulia, Municipality of
Estonia Tallinn, City of Russia Bashkortostan, Republic of
France Cergy-Pontoise, Intermunicipality of Russia Belgorod, Oblast of
France Ile-de-France, Region Russia Chuvashia, Republic of
France Loiret, Departement du Russia Khanty-Mansiysk AO
France Polynesie francaise Russia Komi, Republic of
France Reunion, Region de la Russia Krasnodar, City of
Germany Baden-Wuerttemberg, Land of Russia Krasnodar, Krai of
Germany Bavaria, Free State of Russia Krasnoyarsk, Krai of
Germany Berlin, Land of Russia Mordovia, Republic of
Germany Brandenburg, Land Russia Moscow, City of
Germany Nordrhein-Westfalen, Land of Russia Moscow, Oblast of
Germany Saxony-Anhalt, Land of Russia Nizhniy Novgorod, Oblast
Greece Athens, City of Russia Omsk, City of
Hungary Budapest, City of Russia Omsk, Oblast of
Italy Abruzzo, Region of Russia Samara, Oblast of
Italy Basilicata, Region of Russia St. Petersburg, City of
Italy Bolzano, Autonomous Province of Russia Tatarstan, Republic of
Italy Campania, Region of Russia Volgograd, City of
Italy Lazio, Region of Russia Vologda, Oblast of
Italy Liguria, Region of Serbia Belgrade, City of
Italy Lombardy, Region of Serbia Novi Sad, City of
Italy Milan, City of Serbia Valjevo, City of
S. Ioannou, D. Wójcik and Vladimír Pažitka J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 70 (2021) 101261Appendix A (continued)Country Location17Country LocationItaly Molise, Region of South Africa Bergrivier, Municipality of
Italy Naples, City of South Africa Cape Town, City of
Italy Piedmont, Region of South Africa Ekurhuleni, City of
Italy Sardinia, Autonomous Region of South Africa Johannesburg, City of
Italy Sicily, Autonomous Region of South Africa Nelson Mandela, Metropolitan
Municipality
Italy Trento, Autonomous Province of South Africa Tshwane, City of
Italy Umbria, Region of Spain Andalucia, Junta de
Italy Valle d’Aosta, Autonomous Region of Spain Barcelona, City of
Italy Veneto, Region of Spain Basque Country (The)
Italy Venice, City of Spain Bizkaia, Diputacion Foral de
Japan Fukuoka City Spain Castilla y Leon, Junta de
Japan Fukuoka Prefecture Spain Castilla-La Mancha, Junta de
Comunidades de
Japan Hamamatsu City Spain Catalunya, Generalitat de
Japan Hiroshima Prefecture Spain Extremadura, Junta de
Japan Kyoto, City of Spain Galicia, Comunidad Autonoma de
Japan Nagoya, City of Spain Madrid, Comunidad Autonoma de
Japan Niigata Prefecture Spain Murcia, Comunidad Autonoma de
Japan Osaka City Government Spain Valencia, Generalitat de
Japan Sakai City Sweden Gothenburg, City of
Japan Sapporo, City of Switzerland Berne, City of
Japan Shizuoka City Switzerland Lugano, City of
Japan Shizuoka Prefecture Switzerland Ticino, Republic and Canton of
Japan Yokohama, City of Trinidad &
Tobago
Tobago House of AssemblyKazakhstan Astana, City of Turkey Istanbul, Metropolitan Municipality of
Korea Daejeon Metropolitan City Turkey Izmir, Metropolitan Municipality of
Latvia Riga, City of Ukraine Kharkiv, City of
Malaysia Sarawak, State of Ukraine Kyiv, City of
Mexico Acapulco, Municipality of United Kingdom Aberdeen City Council
Mexico Acolman, Municipality of United Kingdom Cornwall Council
Mexico Aguascalientes, Municipality of United Kingdom Guildford Borough Council
Mexico Baja California, State of United Kingdom Lancashire County Council
Mexico Benito Juarez (Cancun), Municipality
of
United Kingdom Warrington Borough CouncilMexico Campeche, Municipality ofReferences
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